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Abstract. In this study, we investigate dysfunctional information sharing on WhatsApp and 
Facebook, focusing on two explanatory variables — its relationship with the frequency of 
political talk and cross-cutting exposure — and potential remedies, such as witnessing, 
experiencing, and performing social corrections. Results suggest that dysfunctional sharing is 
pervasive, with nearly a quarter reporting sharing misinformation on Facebook and WhatsApp, 
but social corrections also occur relatively frequently. Platform matters, with corrections being 
more likely to be experienced or expressed on WhatsApp than Facebook. Taken together, our 
results suggest that the intimate nature of WhatsApp communication has important consequences 
for the dynamics of misinformation sharing, particularly with regards to facilitating social 
corrections.  
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In the run-up to the 2018 Brazilian elections, false and misleading information was 
widely circulated through the mobile instant messaging service WhatsApp (First Draft, 2019). 
Researchers estimated that roughly half of all images circulating through the service were likely 
altered or distorted to convey false information (Tardáguila et al., 2018). Another study reported 
by The Guardian sampled WhatsApp messages prior to the election and found evidence of a 
politically right-leaning coordinated campaign to spread misinformation and bolster Jair 
Bolsonaro, who ultimately won the election (Avelar, 2019). Similar concerns have been raised in 
other democratic countries, including India and Indonesia, about the use of WhatsApp to spread 
false and misleading information in an effort to affect public opinion and alter election outcomes. 
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Mobile instant messaging services (MIMS), such as WhatsApp, Snapchat and Facebook 
Messenger, are increasingly being used for more than casual communication (Gil de Zúñiga et 
al., 2019; Valeriani and Vaccari, 2017). These private messaging applications became important 
venues for people to talk about political issues and news, access information, and communicate 
with businesses. The Reuters Digital News Report has been consistently capturing this trend: 
while the use of Facebook is declining worldwide, the use of messaging apps is on the rise 
(Nielsen et al., 2019).  
Yet, political communication scholars have largely researched social networking sites 
(SNSs), and less attention has been paid to these burgeoning private messaging apps. One 
challenge for the study of private messaging apps is that they are end-to-end encrypted and by 
design are not broadly visible for easy study by scholars. Nevertheless, as concerns spread 
globally around political propaganda and the intentional spread of politically false information, 
scholars are challenged to identify and measure the extent and effects of misinformation in 
democracies, in both public and private social applications.  
In light of these concerns, this study aims to address this challenge by examining political 
misinformation on WhatsApp in Brazil. Data compiled by "We Are Social”1 places WhatsApp in 
third place among all social platforms, with 1.5 billion monthly active users, only behind 
Facebook and YouTube. In Brazil, WhatsApp is the second most popular social media 
application, with over 120 million users in 2017. The concerns around misinformation on 
WhatsApp have led government institutions, media outlets, and NGOs to create fact-checking 
services to mitigate the spread of false and misleading information in Brazil, and the platform 
itself to fund social science research on this problem, including this study.   
One important dimension of research is understanding who are more likely to share 
misinformation on these private messaging apps. In spite of concerns with coordinated 
disinformation efforts and computational propaganda (Jamieson, 2018; Wooley and Howard, 
2018), regular users are responsible for spreading misinformation in their own networks — a 
behavior that Chadwick, Vaccari and O’Loughlin (2018) have described as "democratically 
dysfunctional news sharing". Although motivations for sharing news on social media may be 
varied, and we cannot assume that those who engage with and share misinformation have the 
intention to trick or troll others, understanding the types of users and behaviors associated with 
dysfunctional news sharing is an important step towards devising strategies to combat the spread 
of misinformation online.  
We adopt a comparative approach to examine dysfunctional sharing on WhatsApp and 
Facebook, as semi-public platforms have been consistently scrutinized for facilitating the spread 
of misinformation because of algorithmic curation and an engagement-driven news feed (Guess 
et al., 2019). Considering the different affordances in these two platforms, comparing 
misinformation sharing dynamics on WhatsApp to Facebook may help understand the 
differences between private and semi-public venues. We conducted a survey on a representative 
sample of internet users in Brazil (N = 1,615) to examine dysfunctional sharing on Facebook and 
WhatsApp by examining both accidental misinformation sharing as well as intentional 
misinformation sharing, in which people recognize the information is incorrect and choose to 
share it anyway2. Specifically, we investigate the relationship between dysfunctional sharing and 
1) frequency of political talk; 2) cross-cutting exposure; 3) social corrections (experiencing, 
witnessing and performing).  
Our findings provide further evidence of a participation vs. misinformation paradox: 
those who are more engaged in political talk are significantly more likely to have shared 
misinformation in the platform they use to discuss politics, and also significantly more likely to 
disinform — in the latter, the relationships are cross-platform, as political talk on WhatsApp is 
associated with intentional misinformation sharing on Facebook and vice-versa. We also find 
that instead of tempering the spread of false information, exposure to cross-cutting political 
views is positively associated with both types of dysfunctional sharing. Those who share 
misinformation are more likely to experience a social correction and to witness other being 
corrected, suggesting that false information does not go unnoticed in peoples' networks. Finally, 
we find that people are significantly more likely to experience, perform, and witness social 
correction on WhatsApp than on Facebook, suggesting that the closer social ties maintained 
through WhatsApp might provide a sense of safety that supports these behaviors. 
 
Changing Patterns in Online News Access: From Social Media to Private Messaging 
Social media platforms and mobile messaging applications are a part of people's daily lives 
in most Western democracies. While many of these platforms has been developed primarily to 
foster social networking and to enable peer-to-peer communication, they are also becoming an 
important source of news (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2019; Nielsen et al., 2019). Social media adds 
another layer to an already crowded and diverse hybrid media environment online by blurring the 
lines between information producers, news media, and regular people, and by providing a space 
that serves for both social and entertainment purposes, as well as to fulfill political and 
informational goals (Chadwick, 2013).  
Scholars have long warned that the high-choice environment of online news could have 
detrimental effects to democracy (Lewandowsky et al., 2012)—particularly by enabling users to 
consume information that supports their world views, while avoiding contrary perspectives (Prior, 
2007). However, research on selective exposure has found little evidence of online echo chambers, 
which can be partially explained by the blurred boundaries between different online platforms 
where people access information (Borgesius et al., 2016; Chadwick, 2013). Likewise, the concern 
that social media algorithms create filter bubbles has been consistently challenged by research on 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, which finds that most social media users are routinely 
exposed to counter-attitudinal information and political difference (Bakshy et al., 2015; Valeriani 
and Vaccari, 2016), and tend to access a higher number of online news sources than those who are 
not using these platforms (Fletcher and Nielsen, 2018). 
There are two important dynamics that help explain how social media changes the 
landscape of information consumption. First, it allows people to maintain large social networks, 
which are primarily comprised of weak ties formed by friends, coworkers, acquaintances and 
colleagues from different stages in life (Ellison and boyd, 2013). Because these ties are 
accumulated over time and formed based on friendship or association, and not for political 
purposes, they have the potential to broaden one's exposure to diverse viewpoints (Bakshy et al., 
2015). Similarly, because of the social dimension of information sharing on social media, people 
who are not seeking news may be exposed to it inadvertently (Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018). In this 
context, individuals can be influenced by their personal networks to consume and select political 
news, as people who frequently share or endorse political information on social media may also 
influence their peers to select information (Anspach, 2017).  
The use of social media is positively associated with several important democratic 
outcomes (Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2012; Valenzuela et al., 2019; Valeriani and Vaccari, 2016). 
Seeking information on social networking sites, in particular, is associated with increasing political 
participation on- and offline, even for those who are accidentally exposed to political content 
(Boulianne, 2015, 2019). Social media serves the function of informing citizens about political 
news and events, it can offer opportunities for involvement and engagement through the influence 
of weak social ties and is also a forum for opinion expression and engagement in informal political 
talk (Boulianne, 2015; 2019). While WhatsApp has been less studied than other social media 
platforms, there is some indication that political discussion on WhatsApp can foster participation 
and activism, particularly for younger citizens (Gil de Zuñiga et al., 2019). 
Research in this field has traditionally concentrated in the US and western European 
countries. Less is known about the political consequences of the use of social media in the Global 
South, despite the high social media penetration in populous countries such as Brazil, India, and 
Indonesia. Researchers studying Chile have warned that the "positive" effects of social media may 
also be associated with problematic ones: increased political engagement, which is positively 
related to social media use for news, leads to information sharing — which includes 
misinformation (Valenzuela et al., 2019) —, suggesting that the dynamics around political uses of 
social media and misinformation need further consideration.   
Our study contributes to this literature by examining the use of Facebook and WhatsApp 
in Brazil, the fourth largest democracy in the world with a population of about 211 million. Internet 
access in Brazil currently reaches 75% of the population (IBGE, 2018). Facebook remains the 
largest social media platform in Brazil, with over 127 million users in 2018. WhatsApp is in a 
close second place, with over 120 million users. The growing access to digital media in Brazil is 
shifting the landscape of news production, access, and circulation. According to the Reuters Digital 
News Report in 2019, 87% of Brazilians are now consuming news online — 54% of the population 
uses Facebook, while 53% use WhatsApp, suggesting that both platforms are becoming central to 
Brazilians' news diet (Nielsen et al., 2019). While several researchers have examined Facebook 
and Twitter for accessing news or talking about politics, little is known about how people are using 
a private messaging space for these purposes. Likewise, research has yet to unveil how the private 
nature of WhatsApp, along with the maintenance of closer social ties, changes how citizens interact 
with information and misinformation. 
           
Online Misinformation 
There has long-been concern about the spread of misinformation in society. 
Misinformation can be understood as occurring when a piece of information that is initially 
considered valid or true is then subsequently recognized as incorrect (Lewandowsky et al., 
2012), or in "cases in which people's beliefs about factual matters are not supported by clear 
evidence and expert opinion" (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010, p. 305). The core idea is that people 
believe in something that is factually incorrect. Others have distinguished misinformation from 
disinformation, the latter of which is defined as efforts to intentionally mislead (Jack, 2017). The 
challenge in this distinction is sorting out the motivations people have for communicating 
verifiably incorrect information. For the purposes of this study, we use the term misinformation 
to apply broadly to the phenomenon of sharing (intentionally or accidentally), being exposed to, 
or believing in verifiably false information.  
Brazilians are particularly worried about political misinformation, registering the highest 
percentage of concern among 38 countries (Newman et al., 2018). There’s clear evidence that 
WhatsApp has been successfully used to spread false and misleading information during 
elections in Brazil, as well as in India and Indonesia (Banaji et al., 2019; Resende et al., 2019), 
despite the company implementing changes to curb virality, banning automated accounts and 
working closely with local authorities (WhatsApp, 2019). It has been reported that candidates, 
parties, and supporters engage in coordinated action using chat groups, used to spread messages 
and to mobilize supporters to share political content with their own peers. Some of these 
campaign activities have been considered illegal in Brazil’s 2018 Election (Campos Mello, 
2019).  
Research on social media and misinformation has focused on Facebook and Twitter (see, 
for example, Valenzuela et al., 2019), and little is known about the role of private messaging apps 
in this context. People, however, are increasingly turning to messaging applications to consume 
and talk about news, as well as to participate in other forms of political engagement (Gil de Zuñiga 
et al., 2019; Nielsen et al., 2019). Given the research that shows a positive relationship between 
social media use, information consumption, and political participation (Boulianne, 2015, 2019), it 
becomes increasingly important to shift our attention to messaging platforms, such as WhatsApp—
the largest private messaging app in the world—, and to understand how they are different or 
similar to social media platforms, such as Facebook.  
WhatsApp has unique affordances that make it challenging to research. Messages are 
protected by end-to-end encryption, meaning that their content cannot be unveiled3. WhatsApp is 
primarily used to chat with closer contacts, as accounts are connected to a mobile number, and 
communication happens in private one-to-one conversations or group chats, which can have up to 
254 people. Despite its increasing use for news, WhatsApp does not feature a "news feed". Because 
of these features, it becomes challenging to research and track illegitimate or malicious activities, 
and to study the content of conversations.  
There are several reasons why it is important to understand behaviors that are associated 
with misinformation sharing on Facebook and WhatsApp, as well as to examine the differences 
between these platforms. First, regular users actively contribute to the circulation of fake news on 
social media (Chadwick et al., 2018), and misinformation spreads faster than truth (Vosoughi et 
al., 2018) — at least on Twitter. Second, while scholars have focused on automated accounts and 
coordinated propaganda, falsehoods shared by regular people may be more effective in 
misinforming or persuading others due to the influence of personal relationships (Anspach, 2017). 
Platform affordances may further influence the circulation of misinformation: on Facebook, the 
news feed favors content shared by people with whom a user tends to engage with, which may 
increase the likelihood that people will see false information. WhatsApp differs greatly from other 
social media platforms with regards to sharing mechanisms: while it is possible to forward content 
from one chat to another (including groups), the lack of a news feed means that the content shared 
on WhatsApp is not easily traceable to a source, as forwarded information does not come with any 
metadata about its origin. This also means that users who share “original” content on WhatsApp 
are either creating that content, uploading images, video, or audio that they found elsewhere, or 
posting a link. Due to these characteristics, it is harder for WhatsApp users to trace the origins of 
content received through chats or groups and to determine its credibility. As well, because of end-
to-end encryption, the company cannot fact-check all the content that is shared by users — unlike 
platforms such as Facebook, Twitter or Instagram — and has focused instead in detecting abnormal 
traceable behaviors (e.g. mass-texting, mass-creation of groups etc) and limiting virality.   
Based on prior research that finds consistent relationships between social media use, 
WhatsApp use, and political participation (Boulliane, 2015, 2019; Gil de Zuñiga et al., 2019; 
Valenzuela et al., 2019; Valeriani & Vaccari, 2017) we hypothesize that sharing misinformation 
accidentally is positively associated with frequency of political talk on these platforms. Scholars 
provide compelling evidence that political talk is important for a well-informed citizenry, and it 
plays an important role as a precursor of other forms of political engagement (Kim and Kim, 
2008). We postulate this hypothesis because of the consideration that users who accidentally 
share misinformation are engaging in information sharing, which is a form of political 
participation online (Valenzuela et al., 2019).  
 
H1) Frequency of political talk on (a) Facebook and (b) WhatsApp is positively 
associated with sharing misinformation accidentally in the platform. 
 
A second dimension of dysfunctional sharing is doing so on purpose — a behavior that is 
more challenging to measure, at least in self-reported data (Chadwick et al.,2018). While sharing 
accidentally and on purpose are different behaviors, existing research has not, to our knowledge, 
investigated these two types of dysfunctional sharing separately. Thus:  
 
RQ1) Is frequency of political talk on (a) Facebook and (b) WhatsApp associated with 
sharing misinformation on purpose in the platform? 
 
Information sharing on social media is affected by users' perceptions of their networks.  
The predominance of weak ties on Facebook has been associated with exposure to diverse 
viewpoints (Bakshy et al., 2015; Bode, 2012; Kim, 2011), and users tend to consider whether 
others will share their opinions before posting on social media (Vraga et al., 2015; Weeks et al., 
2017). While the risk of "context collapse” might constrain expression on Facebook, there is 
evidence that mobile messaging apps provide a "safer" space for political talk (Valeriani & 
Vaccari, 2017), which could in turn incentivize more active sharing of information among well-
known peers. In this context, we seek to understand how political talk and cross-cutting 
exposure—when one is exposed to ideologically diverse perspectives (Mutz, 2006)—may help 
explain how WhatsApp and Facebook users engage with misinformation online.  
Engagement in cross-cutting political talk may play an important role in mitigating the 
spread of misinformation. Scholars have argued that motivated reasoning — one’s willingness to 
accept information that is consistent with one’s viewpoints — helps explain why people believe 
in falsehoods (Nyhan and Reifler, 2010). Exposure to cross-cutting perspectives may have the 
potential to mitigate misinformation insofar as falsehoods might be challenged by those on the 
other side. Based on this literature, we pose the following questions to investigate the 
relationship between sharing misinformation and exposure to cross-cutting political perspectives. 
 
RQ2) How does exposure to disagreement on (a) Facebook and (b) WhatsApp affect 
accidental misinformation sharing? 
RQ3) How does the presence of disagreement on (a) Facebook and (b) WhatsApp affect 
purposeful misinformation sharing?  
 
 Scholars have explored the effectiveness of potential remedies to combat online 
misinformation, such as corrective affordances and fact-checking. Misinformation is notably 
hard to correct (Lewandowsky et al., 2012), particularly when it relates to preexisting attitudes, 
which is often the case around political topics (Nyhan and Reifler, 2015; Thorson, 2016). Prior 
research has found a significant effect of algorithmic correction (e.g. related stories) and 
anonymous social corrections on Facebook in reducing health-related misperceptions (Bode and 
Vraga, 2015, 2018). However, research investigating political misinformation suggests that 
corrections are often ineffective, emphasizing the role of motivated reasoning in the maintenance 
of misperceptions (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010, 2015). While we cannot investigate the effectiveness 
of social corrections using cross-sectional data, we propose a distinction between three types of 
corrective behaviors — exposure to people correcting others online, performing a correction, and 
being corrected by someone else — and investigate the relationship between these behaviors and 
sharing misinformation on WhatsApp and Facebook.  
 
RQ4) How does (a) experiencing, (b) witnessing, or (c) performing a social correction 
affect the likelihood of posting misinformation accidentally and on purpose on WhatsApp and 
Facebook? 
RQ5) Are there differences between platforms in terms of (a) experiencing, (b) 
witnessing, or (c) performing a social correction?  
 
Method 
We conducted a survey with a nationally representative sample of internet users in Brazil 
(N=1,615), using demographic quotas to proportionally represent regional differences based on 
age, gender, and education4. Sample size was calculated considering a 2% margin of error and 
95% confidence level. The survey was conducted by Ibope, a large national survey company, 
and combines online panel interviews (N=1,431) and random digit dial interviews (N=184). We 
supplemented the online panel data with phone interviews to reach demographics that are not 
using online panels – e.g. respondents with lower education levels and older people, who may 
primarily or exclusively have mobile internet access. Among Brazilian internet users, it is 
estimated that 97% use a mobile device and that WhatsApp is installed on virtually all of them. 
Given our interests, our sample only includes WhatsApp users. Questions about Facebook were 
only asked to respondents who use it (89% of the sample). The data was collected from May 21st 
to July 3rd, 2019. Response rates based on AAPOR’s RR1 standards (2016) were of 26% for 
phone-based interviews. As the web-based surveys were conducted on a large non-probability 
panel using demographic quotas, the AAPOR’s standards do not apply (AAPOR, 2016), and the 
completion rate of 25% for panel was calculated based on the number of questionnaires started 
and completed.  
While we acknowledge that self-reported measurements for misinformation sharing are 
imperfect, as they rely on respondents recall, may suffer from desirability biases, and may not 
reflect actual experiences, other approaches that have been applied to social media platforms 
(e.g. collecting user data) cannot be applied to an encrypted messaging application. In the 
absence of user data, we believe that a nationally representative survey was better suited provide 
an overview of how WhatsApp has been used as a source of information and as a place for 




Accidental Misinformation Sharing. We measured accidental sharing using the following 
question: " In the past month, do you recall sharing a news story that seemed accurate at the 
time, but you later found out was exaggerated or made up on Facebook / WhatsApp?" The 
options were yes, no, and I don't remember. 
Purposeful Misinformation Sharing. We conceptualize purposeful misinformation sharing as a 
self-reported measure of having shared information on Facebook or WhatsApp in spite of 
thinking it was false. The item was measured with the following question: "In the past month, do 
you recall sharing a news story that you thought was made up or exaggerated when you shared it 
on Facebook / WhatsApp?". The options were yes, no, and I don't remember. 
Independent Variables 
Frequency of Political Discussion. Frequency of political discussion was measured using a 5-
point Likert scale ranging from never (1) to every day or almost every day (5). The question 
asked: "Considering the past month, how often did you talk about politics and social issues (such 
as elections, government, education, violence, etc.) on Facebook/WhatsApp?". (MFB= 3.08, SDFB 
= 4.59, MWA= 3.13, SDWA = 3.66).   
Cross-cutting exposure. Frequency of cross-cutting exposure was measured with a 5-item Likert 
scale ranging from never (1) to always (5). Participants were asked "Thinking about the content 
about politics and social issues your friends shared on Facebook/WhatsApp in the past month, 
how often do you generally disagree with the views expressed by them?" (MFB= 3.32, SDFB = 
0.91, MWA= 3.22, SDWA = 0.96).   
Political Information in WhatsApp Groups. This binary variable refers to seeing conversations 
about politics in WhatsApp group chats. It includes respondents who participated in WhatsApp 
groups, defined as conversations with 3 or more contacts (88.6%), and saw conversations about 
politics in all of them (20.07%), in more than half (20.84%), or in less than half of them 
(33.12%).  
Experiencing Social Correction. This item was measured with the following question: "In the 
past month, did any of these situations happen to you...I was told the news I had shared on 
Facebook/WhatsApp was exaggerated, inaccurate, or made up." Participants could answer yes, 
no, or I don't know.  
Witnessing Social Correction. This item was measured with the following question: "In the past 
month, did any of these situations happen to you...I saw someone else being called out for 
sharing news on Facebook/WhatsApp that was exaggerated, inaccurate, or made up." 
Participants could answer yes, no, or I don't know. 
Performing social corrections. This item was measured with the following question: "In the past 
month, did any of these situations happen to you...I told someone that the news they had shared 
on Facebook/WhatsApp was exaggerated, inaccurate, or made up". Participants could answer 
yes, no, or I don't know. 
Sharing to correct. This item was measured with the following question: "In the past month, did 
any of these situations happen to you… I shared news that I knew was inaccurate to alert others 
that it was circulating on Facebook/WhatsApp". Participants could answer yes, no, or I don't 
know.  
Media use. Participants were asked how frequently they used a set of media sources to consume 
information about politics and social issues, using a 5-point scale ranging from never to every 
day or almost every day. For the purposes of this paper, we included the following sources: 
Legacy news7 (M=3.12, SD = 1.14), Social Media (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) (M=3.44, SD = 
1.50), WhatsApp (M=3.08, SD=1.55). 
Misinformed Beliefs. We used a battery of 15 statements to measure if participants held 
misinformed beliefs and added their answers to generate a score. Items were derived out of an 
initial 40 pre-tested items, chosen for diversity of topics, that were not significantly correlated 
with key demographics on the pretest. We included 5 truthful statements and 10 false statements. 
Each incorrect answer counted one-point, correct and “I don’t know” answers did not count 
points.   
Political Knowledge. Political knowledge was measured using five items, aligned with prior 
research (Carpini and Keeter, 1993; Pereira, 2013). We asked about the offices held by the vice-
president of Brazil and the president of Argentina, the name of the president of the Senate, Jair 
Bolsonaro's party in the 2018 elections, and the party holding the majority of seats in the House 
of Representatives. Correct answers to these questions were combined to form a political 
knowledge score (M=2.11, SD = 1.61). 
Political Extremism. Given Brazil's multi-party system, ideology was measured with a 10-point 
scale ranging from left to right (M = 6.3, SD= 2.62). We recoded responses 1 and 2 on the left 
and 9 and 10 on the right as a binary of political extremism — 30% of the respondents fell into 
this category, while 45.5% were not 'extreme', and 23% responded they did not know.    
Demographics. Age was measured using an open-ended question (M=36, SD=13) and analyzed 
as a continuous variable. Education was measured with a single question and 5 answer items, 
ranging from completed pre-school (1) to completed college or above (5). The sample was 
53.3% female and 46.7% male, which mirrors the distribution of internet users.  
 
Results 
We first present some descriptive statistics to establish the prevalence of democratically 
dysfunctional sharing behaviors. As shown in Table 1, 25% of respondents acknowledged having 
shared misinformation accidentally on Facebook and on WhatsApp, t (2733) = -0.23, p = 0.8, d 
= 0.01 (MWA = 1.684, MFB = 1.680). Purposeful sharing was reported at a lower rate, with only 
13% on Facebook and 14% on WhatsApp, t(2785) = -0.37, p = 0.7, d = 0.01 (MWA = 1.845, MFB 
= 1.840). The differences between platforms for both types of sharing were not significant.   
 
Table 1. Frequency of Dysfunctional Sharing 
 
Type of Sharing Frequency 
Accidental Sharing on Facebook  
Yes 25.94 % 
No 55.05 % 
Don't know/Don't remember 19.01 % 
Accidental Sharing on WhatsApp  
Yes 28.67% 
No 61.98 % 
Don't know/Don't remember 9.35 % 
Purposeful Sharing on Facebook  
Yes 13.19% 
No 69.41% 
Don't know/Don't remember 17.40% 
Purposeful Sharing on WhatsApp  
Yes 14.36% 
No 78.51% 
Don't know/Don't remember 7.12% 
 
Focusing on our key explanatory variables, Table 2 presents the frequency of political 
talk. Participants in our sample used WhatsApp more frequently than Facebook to engage in 
discussions, particularly those who talk about politics on a daily basis. About 24% of our sample 
did not use Facebook to talk about politics, and 22% did not use WhatsApp for this purpose. The 
differences between platforms are significant, with WhatsApp being used more frequently than 
Facebook, t(3011) = -2.6, p = 0.009, d  = 0.09 (MWA = 3.01, MFB = 2.88).   
 
Table 2. Frequency of Political Talk 
 Facebook WhatsApp 
Never  24.83 % 22.57 % 
Less than once a month 17.43 % 14.94 %  
A few times a month 17.99 % 20.46 % 
A few times a week 24.41 %  22.50 % 
Everyday or almost everyday 15.34 % 19.53 % 
Total 100 % 100% 
        Note: valid percentages, excluding participants who said they did not remember. 
 
Most respondents acknowledge seeing cross-cutting political opinions on Facebook and 
WhatsApp, with about a third of them saying they see it very often or always (Table 3). Notably, 
respondents are more likely to witness disagreement on Facebook than WhatsApp, t(2863) = 2.9, 
p = 0.004, d = -0.11 (MWA = 3.22, MFB = 3.32).        
 
Table 3. Frequency of cross-cutting exposure 
 Facebook WhatsApp 
Never  2.35 % 3.71 % 
Rarely 8.35 % 13 %  
Sometimes 44.76 % 44.33 % 
Very often 19.87 %  19.5 % 
Always 10.71 % 10.77 % 
Total 100 % 100% 
Note: valid percentages, excluding participants who said they did not remember. 
 
Next, we present the distributions of the three types of social correction in Table 4. At the 
bivariate level, people report having experienced, witnessed, and engaged in social corrections 
more frequently on WhatsApp than on Facebook. Social corrections occur relatively frequently 
in both platforms, with 42% of the respondents having witnessed it on Facebook and 47% on 
WhatsApp.  
 
Table 4. Frequency of Social Corrections 
 
 Frequency N 
Experiencing social corrections   
Facebook 26.44% 427 
WhatsApp 36.05 % 597 
Witnessing social corrections   
Facebook 41.96% 551 
WhatsApp 46.78 % 689 
Engaging in social corrections   
Facebook 32.03% 427 
WhatsApp 40.15% 597 
Note: valid percentages are reported, excluding participants who said they did not remember 
 
We use a set of logistic regression models to address our hypotheses and research 
questions, controlling for age, gender, level of education, frequency of political talk, frequency 
of news use, political knowledge, political extremism, and holding misinformed beliefs. The 
models had the following platform-specific independent variables: frequency of cross-cutting 
exposure, witnessing social corrections, performing social corrections, being corrected, and 
sharing misinformation to correct it8. Table 5 presents the models for on WhatsApp, and Table 6 
presents the models for Facebook. 
 
Table 5. Logistic Regressions predicting accidental and intentional sharing on WhatsApp  
  
 Misinformation on WhatsApp Disinformation on WhatsApp 
 B (SE) Exp(b) CI 2.5%, 97.5% B (SE) Exp(b) CI: 2.5%, 97.5% 
Constant -1.19 (0.83) 0.31     [0.06, 1.55] -1.06 (1.13) 0.35     [0.04, 3.16] 
Age -0.01 (0.01) 0.99     [0.98, 1.01] -0.02 (0.01) 0.98     [0.95, 1.00] 
Female 0.19 (0.21) 1.21     [0.80, 1.83] -0.45 (0.3) 0.63     [0.36, 1.13] 
Education -0.21 (0.10) * 0.81    [0.66, 0.99] -1.19 (0.14) 0.83     [0.63, 1.08] 
Political Knowledge -0.08 (0.07) 0.92     [0.81, 1.05] -1.31 (0.09) *** 0.73  [0.61, 0.88] 
Political Extremism -0.05 (0.19) 0.95     [0.65, 1.38] -0.29 (0.26) 0.75     [0.45, 1.25] 
Misinformed Beliefs 0.05 (0.04) 1.05     [0.97, 1.13] 0.02 (0.05) 1.02     [0.92, 1.12] 
Media Use: Legacy -0.17 (0.11) 0.84     [0.67, 1.05] 0.03 (0.16) 1.03     [0.76, 1.40] 
Media Use: Social Media 0.01 (0.1) 1.01     [0.82, 1.23] -0.30 (0.15) * 0.74   [0.55, 1.00] 
Media Use: WhatsApp 0.33 (0.1) *** 1.39  [1.15, 1.68] 0.24 (0.15) 1.27     [0.94, 1.72] 
FB: Political Discussion 0.02 (0.09) 1.02     [0.86, 1.21] 0.38 (0.13) ** 1.46  [1.13, 1.88] 
WP: Political Discussion 0.20 (0.1) * 1.22  [1.01, 1.47] 0.26 (0.14) 1.30     [0.99, 1.70] 
Freq. Cross-Cutting Exp. (WP) 0.22 (0.1) * 1.25   [1.02, 1.52] 0.42 (0.13) ** 1.52  [1.17, 1.98] 
WhatsApp Political Groups -0.12 (0.25) 0.89     [0.55, 1.45] -0.43 (0.37) 0.65     [0.32, 1.33] 
Witnessing Corrections (WP) 0.39 (0.2) 1.47     [0.99, 2.20] 0.24 (0.3) 1.27     [0.70, 2.30] 
Was Corrected (WP) 1.48 (0.21) *** 4.38 [2.93, 6.57] 2.03 (0.27) *** 7.60 [4.46, 12.95] 
Performed Corrections (WP) 0.21 (0.2) 1.36     [0.91, 2.02] 0.03 (0.29) 1.03     [0.59, 1.80] 
Shared to Correct (WP) -0.89 (0.21) *** 0.41 [0.27, 0.62] -1.49 (0.27) *** 0.23 [0.13, 0.38] 
N  848              871             
AIC  813.75   488.78 
BIC  899.12   574.63 
Log-likelihood  -388.9 (df=18)  -226.4 (df=18) 
Pseudo R2 (Cragg-Uhler)  0.42           0.58          
 Note: *** p < 0.001;  ** p < 0.01;  * p < 0.05. AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion. 
 
 
Table 6. Logistic regressions predicting accidental and intentional sharing on Facebook  
 
 Misinformation on Facebook Disinformation on Facebook 
 B (SE) Exp(b) CI 2.5% 97.5% B (SE) Exp(b) CI 2.5% 97.5% 
Constant -1.26 (0.84) 0.28 [0.05, 1.48] -2.48 (1.12) * 0.08  [0.01, 0.75] 
Age -0.00 (0.01) 1.00 [0.98, 1.01] -0.02 (0.01) 0.98 [0.96, 1.00] 
Female -0.16 (0.2) 0.85 [0.57, 1.27] -0.33 (0.27) 0.72 [0.42, 1.21] 
Education -1.26 (0.1) ** 0.77 [0.63, 0.93] -0.09 (0.13) 0.92 [0.71, 1.18] 
Political Knowledge -0.19 (0.06) ** 0.83 [0.73, 0.94] -0.24 (0.09) ** 0.79 [0.67, 0.93] 
Political Extremism -0.18 (0.19) 0.83 [0.58, 1.21] -0.42 (0.25) 0.65 [0.40, 1.08] 
Misinformed Beliefs 0.05 (0.04) 1.05 [0.98, 1.13] 0.1 (0.05) * 1.10 [1.01, 1.21] 
Media Use: Legacy 0.03 (0.1) 1.04 [0.84, 1.27] 0.05 (0.15) 1.05 [0.78, 1.40] 
Media Use: Social Media 0.22 (0.08) * 1.25 [1.04, 1.50] -0.43 (0.14) ** 0.65 [0.49, 0.86] 
Media Use: WhatsApp -0.13 (0.08) 0.88 [0.75, 1.03] 0.48 (0.14) *** 1.61 [1.22, 2.13] 
FB: Political Discussion 0.20 (0.08) *  1.22 [1.04, 1.43] 0.22 (0.12) 1.24 [0.98, 1.58] 
WP: Political Discussion  0.15 (0.09)      1.16 [0.98, 1.38] 0.35 (0.13) ** 1.42 [1.11, 1.82] 
Freq. Cross-Cutting Exp.(FB) 0.24 (0.1) * 1.27 [1.04, 1.56] 0.40 (0.13) ** 1.48 [1.14, 1.93] 
Witnessing Corrections (FB) 0.54 (0.2) ** 1.72 [1.16, 2.54] 0.03 1.03 [0.59, 1.78] 
Was Corrected (FB) 1.77 (0.23) *** 5.90 [3.74, 9.29] 1.35 (0.28) *** 3.86 [2.24, 6.66] 
Performed Corrections (FB) -0.03 (0.22) 0.97 [0.63, 1.48] -0.12 (0.3) 0.89 [0.49, 1.61] 
Shared to Correct (FB) -0.76 (0.24) ** 0.47 [0.29, 0.75] -1.11 (0.29) *** 0.33  [0.19, 0.58] 
N 907              908                     
AIC 867.18               542.55               
BIC 948.96               624.34               
Log-likelihood -416.6 (df = 17)   -254.3 (df=17)   
Pseudo R2 (Cragg-Uhler) 0.41               0.51               
 Note: *** p < 0.001;  ** p < 0.01;  * p < 0.05. AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion. 
  
 
Examining the demographic controls, we find that age and gender are not associated with 
either form of dysfunctional sharing. However, education has a negative relationship with 
accidental misinformation sharing on Facebook and on WhatsApp—the higher one's level of 
education, the less likely one is to share misinformation accidentally. These relationships are not 
significant for intentional sharing. Political knowledge was negatively associated with both types 
of dysfunctional sharing on Facebook, and with accidental sharing on WhatsApp. Political 
extremism was not a significant predictor in either of the four models.  
Frequency of legacy media use was not a significant predictor of dysfunctional sharing in 
either platform, but those who use social media as a source of news are more likely to have 
accidentally shared misinformation on Facebook, and less likely to have shared misinformation 
intentionally on both Facebook and WhatsApp. Frequency of WhatsApp use for news is 
positively associated with accidental sharing on WhatsApp and intentional sharing on Facebook. 
Finally, holding misinformed beliefs was a significant predictor of sharing misinformation 
intentionally on Facebook, increasing the likelihood of intentional sharing by 10%. 
The results confirm our hypothesis that frequency of political talk on both Facebook and 
WhatsApp would be positively associated with sharing misinformation accidentally. 
Respondents who talk about politics more frequently on WhatsApp or on Facebook are each 
about 22% more likely to say they shared misinformation accidentally on the platform. 
  Our first research question further explored this relationship with regard to intentional 
misinformation sharing. Interestingly, we only find cross-platform relationships: those who talk 
about politics on Facebook are 46% more likely to engage in intentional misinformation sharing 
on WhatsApp, and those who talk about politics more frequently on WhatsApp are 42% more 
likely to share misinformation intentionally on Facebook. 
  Answering our second research question, being exposed to diverse opinions frequently on 
Facebook increases the likelihood of sharing misinformation on Facebook by 27%, and on 
WhatsApp by 25%. Cross-cutting exposure is also a strong predictor of intentional sharing: on 
WhatsApp, those exposed to cross-cutting talk are 52% more likely to have shared 
misinformation intentionally on WhatsApp, and 48% more likely to do so on Facebook (RQ3). 
  The fourth research question inquired about the effects of social corrections on 
intentional misinformation sharing. Being corrected for sharing misinformation is strongly and 
positively related to both types of sharing across platforms. Having witnessed someone else 
being corrected is also positively associated with having shared misinformation on Facebook, but 
not on WhatsApp. There was no significant relationship between performing a social correction 
and either type of dysfunctional sharing. Notably, those who shared misinformation accidentally 
and intentionally on both WhatsApp and Facebook are significantly less likely to have done so to 
alert others about it. 
Lastly, we investigated platform effects on social corrections (RQ5). Respondents were 
more likely to have experienced, t(2804) = 2.3, p = 0.02, d = 0.09, performed, t(2808) = 4.5, p 
< 0.001, d  = 2.67,  and witnessed social corrections on WhatsApp than on Facebook, t(2754) = 
2.6, p = 0.01, d = 0.1, suggesting consistent platform differences.   
 
Discussion 
 Contributing to the debate about the relationship between social media and the spread of 
misinformation online, this study has sought to understand how indicators of democratically 
relevant social media use, such as engaging in political talk and being exposed to cross-cutting 
discussions, are related to dysfunctional information sharing. Our results suggest that talking 
about politics on Facebook and on WhatsApp are strongly associated with sharing 
misinformation. These findings can be interpreted in light of research on news sharing, which 
suggests that more active social media users — and particularly those who use social media for 
news — are more likely to engage in sharing (Choi and Lee, 2015; Weeks and Holbert, 2013). If 
we consider that information sharing is typically associated with higher interest and involvement 
with online news (Kalogeropoulos et al., 2017), it is unsurprising that those who actively 
participate in political discussions on both Facebook and WhatsApp are also more likely to share 
misinformation accidentally simply because they already tend to share news more frequently.  
 Prior research using observational data found that older social media users were more 
likely to share misinformation on Facebook (Guess et al., 2019). In our sample, age and gender 
were not significant predictors of these behaviors, and education was the only significant key 
demographic. These differences might be related to the use of self-reported measures in our 
study — it is possible that people share misinformation accidentally at a higher rate than they 
acknowledge, and it may also be the case that they share without knowing it is false. Contrary to 
prior findings in the US context (Guess et al., 2019), we also did not find a relationship between 
extreme ideological positions and dysfunctional sharing. These results might reflect the complex 
nature of partisanship and political ideology in the context of multi-party systems with high 
levels of dissatisfaction with the political system and democratic instability: not only citizens 
face challenges to navigate the political ideologies of their chosen candidates and parties (as 
these may vary in local, regional and national coalitions), but they may also not find themselves 
strongly affiliated with either side of the political spectrum. Thus, in countries with a more 
diverse partisan spectrum, hyper-personalized political preferences, and democratic instability, 
ideologic extremity may not reflect ideology and partisanship in the same way it does in more 
stable bipartisan systems.   
When it comes to purposeful sharing, we observed a cross-platform relationship: talking 
about politics on Facebook is associated with intentional sharing on WhatsApp and vice-versa. It 
is possible that being constantly exposed to others' opinions by talking politics on WhatsApp or 
Facebook constraints sharing misinformation due to fear of social sanctions or of sharing 
minoritarian opinions. In this context, a platform where the users are less active in discussing 
politics might offer a 'safer' space for sharing misinformation. Another explanation might be that 
users who share misinformation intentionally are aware of its potential backlash, and therefore 
refrain from sharing it among their more frequent discussion peers. This perspective might be 
supported by our findings that political talk on either platform is positively associated with 
accidental misinformation sharing in the platform but not with purposeful sharing— suggesting 
that these behaviors might be associated with distinct social costs to users. Different sharing 
affordances may also help explain the differences between accidental and purposeful sharing: 
while accidental sharing might be a consequence of a more active sharing behavior in general, 
which would leverage in-platform forwarding and sharing mechanisms, purposeful sharing might 
be less dependent on the ease of sharing in-platform, which helps explain our cross-platform 
results.  
 Contrary to prior research on Twitter (Chadwick et al., 2018), we find that exposure to 
cross-cutting political talk was a predictor of accidental and intentional misinformation sharing 
in both platforms. The relationship was stronger for intentional sharing, suggesting that exposure 
to heterogeneous information might influence users to knowingly spread false content in both 
their WhatsApp and Facebook networks. Our findings on the positive relationships between 
frequency of political talk and cross-cutting exposure and dysfunctional news sharing are aligned 
with what Valenzuela et al. (2019) describes as the paradox of participation and misinformation: 
behaviors that are associated with positive political outcomes (e.g. participation, cross-cutting 
exposure) may have detrimental civic consequences (e.g. spreading misinformation). However, it 
is worth noting that our measure for cross-cutting exposure captures users’ perceptions of the 
opinion climate around them, and not the actual content they saw. Nevertheless, the finding that 
cross-cutting exposure in a given platform was more strongly related to intentional sharing – a 
cross-platform behavior – than accidental sharing might suggest that, for those who intentionally 
share misinformation, the perception of a heterogeneous opinion environment may lead them to 
use a different platform to disseminate this type of content—potentially to avoid backlash, or in 
search for a more receptive audience.   
While we do not have information on users' motivations to share dysfunctional news 
content, we controlled for one civic motivation — sharing false information to correct it or alert 
others, which had a negative effect in all four models. This is not sufficient to imply that 
respondents were intentionally trying to deceive, but it suggests that the motivations behind 
purposeful misinformation sharing was not aligned with the civic goal of informing others.  
The finding that membership in WhatsApp groups where politics is discussed is not 
associated with dysfunctional sharing has important consequences for research on political uses 
of WhatsApp, as scholars have relied on the analysis of large groups dedicated to politics 
(Bradshaw and Howard, 2018; Resende et al., 2019), which do not reflect the experience of most 
users (WhatsApp, 2019). This naturally poses a challenge to future research, given the severe 
limitations in obtaining data from encrypted platforms, and the reliance on public discussion 
groups for content analyses.  
 We also investigated the role of social corrections. Those who share misinformation on 
Facebook and WhatsApp are significantly more likely to have experienced a social correction, 
which may temper concerns raised by Chadwick, Vaccari, and O’Loughlin (2018) that these 
behaviors are not noticed nor corrected in private channels and on social media. Witnessing a 
correction is only positively associated with sharing misinformation accidentally on Facebook. 
This might be explained by the more public nature of the platform. On WhatsApp, it is possible 
that corrections occur in one-to-one chats even when misinformation is shared in groups, making 
it less visible to bystanders given the private nature of the platform. 
Looking at differences between platforms and the three types of social corrections at the 
bivariate level, we find that WhatsApp users are more likely than Facebook users to perform, 
experience, and witness social corrections. Considering that WhatsApp conversations tend to be 
among closer peers, it is possible that users perceive it as a safer space than Facebook to correct 
others because they have a better sense of how their friends may react, and users may also be 
more willing to acknowledge such corrections given their private nature. While these results 
suggest that misinformation does not go unchallenged on social media and on WhatsApp, we 
cannot assess the direction of the relationship based on cross-sectional data. Particularly with 
regards to accidental sharing, it is possible that the positive relationship signals that the 
correction raised awareness to the fact that a particular piece of information was not true. 
Our study has limitations. First, our measures reflect what respondents perceive to be 
misinformation, not actual behaviors, and we are unable to assess what types and topics of 
misinformation respondents share. Relatedly, our measure can only account for those who are 
aware they have shared misinformation, and it is possible that those who said they did not 
engage in any type of dysfunctional sharing might be unaware of it. Second, we cannot make 
causal claims on the nature of the relationships that we find using cross-sectional data, which has 
important implications for understanding findings around social corrections. In spite of these, we 
believe this study makes an important contribution by exploring the behaviors associated with 
dysfunctional sharing in two of the most used social platforms globally by examining the case of 
Brazil. While our findings cannot be extrapolated to other countries, they provide insights to help 
scholars understand the potential democratic consequences of the move towards private 
communication, which may soon become the new norm given Facebook’s move towards 
encryption with Messenger and Instagram, and the increasing popularity of alternative messaging 
applications such as Telegram and Signal. 
 
Conclusion 
Given the rising concern with the spread of misinformation in mobile messaging 
applications, particularly in countries where these tools are widely used for a variety of purposes, 
we investigate behaviors that help explain misinformation sharing on WhatsApp and Facebook. 
Our results provide further evidence of a "paradox" between positive and negative engagement 
on social media (Valenzuela et al., 2019), and extend it to mobile messaging apps: behaviors that 
are routinely associated with democratic gains, such as talking about politics, using social media 
for news, and being exposed to cross-cutting opinions (Gil de Zuñiga et al., 2019; Valeriani & 
Vaccari, 2017), are also associated with dysfunctional information sharing.  
While these behaviors are fairly common, our results suggest that those who share false 
information online are likely to be corrected by others in their network. These findings help 
alleviate concerns that those who share misinformation online are not challenged for doing so 
and highlights important dynamics in terms of how different social ties, as well as more private 
discussion environments, play a role in this context. While we cannot assess whether social 
corrections are effective in mitigating misinformed beliefs, closer relationships may have the 
potential to help reduce misinformed beliefs insofar as personal connections can influence 
information selection (Anspach, 2017). More research is needed, however, to investigate whether 
social corrections by strong and weak ties are effective remedies not only to misinformation 
sharing, but also to mitigate misinformed beliefs. 
As mobile messaging applications become a gateway for people to discuss politics and to 
access information, it is important to understand the extent to which engaging in these activities 
may also increase exposure to misinformation, particularly given that messages circulating in 
those apps often have little context and may not include some of the visual and contextual cues 
that have been shown to help users assess the credibility of online news, such as “related stories”, 
links to a source, or independent fact-checks (Bode and Vraga, 2015). While messaging 
platforms may not be able to fact-check messages due to encryption, our findings suggest that 
mobile messaging apps should gear their interfaces to help users assess the credibility of a 
message before sharing with peers. Rather than simply focusing on mechanisms that limit the 
speed and the extent of a message spreading, as WhatsApp has done so far, future platform 
changes to curb misinformation need to consider that context around messages is crucial to help 
users identify problematic content, which may prevent them to accidentally forward 
misinformation to their peers.  
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Notes:   
1 https://wearesocial.com/global-digital-report-2019 (Last access: August 20, 2019). 
2 Scholars such as Jack (2017) have defined purposeful and coordinated efforts of sharing false or misleading 
information as “disinformation”. We do not adopt this term to refer to what we call “intentional misinformation 
sharing” because we are not explicitly studying coordinated efforts of misinformation sharing, and we also do not 
know the motives behind the intentional sharing behaviors we investigate.  
3 Messages are only visible by those participating in a conversation or group, and may be forwarded within the app, 
but there is no legitimate way of accessing messages without being a part of the conversation, which is why some 
studies have focused on large group chats.  
4 Quotas were based on the Annual Survey on the Use of Digital Technologies in Brazil (Cetic.br/IBOPE). 
5 Unless otherwise stated, respondents were asked separate questions for each platform.  
6 Our dependent variables are based on single-item measurements, which is a limitation. Other studies on the topic 
have been published using a similar approach (Chadwick et al., 2018; Gil de Zúñiga et al., 2019). Given the novelty 
of the problem, there is no consensus on what the most valid and reliable multi-question measures of misinformation 
and disinformation might be.  
7 The scale for Legacy news use combines Television, Radio, Newspapers and Online news. Cronbach's alpha: 0.78.  
8 Given that prior research on misinformation has suggested a relationship between partisanship, frequency of political talk, and 
dysfunctional sharing, we tested interactions between these variables in two ways. first, we tested models for each platform with 
in-platform frequency of political talk interactions; then we tested models with both in- and cross-platform interactions, resulting 
in eight different models with this configuration. The interactions were not significant and did not improve the models, so we 
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